tv American History TV CSPAN March 26, 2016 11:00pm-12:01am EDT
the mother came out of the house, she was terrified. she was under the impression that these americans were going to harm her children. they pulled out a couple of hershey bars. we learned some lessons from per se. -- from versailles. you can read how we brought to japan into the coalition of would help contain soviet expansion. it is a remarkable story. and the western alliance obvious earlyomes
on. the american occupation troops floating in japan are to the north korean onslaught. was the counter information by macarthur, the brilliant stabilizedoke that the situation it is interesting that some of the lst's were manned by japanese. location was critical in -- for maintaining south korea the way it is as an ally today. japan is important. it allowed us to fully deploy in the region and provide credibility for the united states. thanks to the agreement in 1972,
the uss navasota was able to do minesweeping. do the math. chip forward, deployed, you need to have three ships in your inventory. to accommodate the transit and maintenance cycles. currently, we have 20 ships in the home port authority in japan. two additional air carriers, eight additional amphibious ships, ate mine countermeasure ships and a dozen destroyers to meet the mission. these forward deployed ships need downtime for upkeep will stop when i was in navasota, i remember the quality of the work done at the shipyard. we were talking about some radio equipment and this
shipyard worker told me, i could get this done for you isn't saidy important and it i yes. and he said, well i have a wedding tomorrow i could put off. i was impressed by the dedication and quality of work. it should be the midway. we aircraft carrier midway, stationed an aircraft in japan in 1974 that was 28-years-old. that's carriers sister ship, the franklin d roosevelt was taken out of service. in the good care in hands of the in tokyo, ourards
naval shipyard there, she was maintained in pristine condition and served in the western pacific for the next two decades. ship and ourant efforts in the gulf wars and indian ocean. a forward presence. dones to the work that was with her japan, she is now in san diego. .lmost a museum ship a testimony to the good work the us.nese performed for also is the importance of japan as part of our strategy in bringing the japanese. war is aboute cold containing the soviet union and communism. as far as containing communism and asia, take a look at the scorecard. not too good. besides the soviet union, china, south korea, vietnam, laos, cambodia over the course of the falling underinto
the coming his banner. not too good. the 1950's, communism was monolithic. we have learned subsequently that i been his was not monolithic. dr. kissinger accomplished diplomacy but we failed in southeast asia in the 11-year war. , we move to containment in the soviet union. to the manchurian border. turn the 1980's, we had pretty and consideredip china as a strong ally versus the soviet union. as some of the challenges over the decades to execute the toicy, for the united states maintain a containment policy it was no easy matter. united may -- united states is
an island nation. my former boss, james holloway then third, said he had a meeting with secretary of defense harry brown and the carter administration. of the soviet union in the 1970's. brown argued we needed to pursue civility with the soviet union by achieving parity. -- for ourt he allies to even know the united states needed to control the high seas, the navy, on the sea denialwas as force. union,r with the soviet not anoviet navy was
option. let's go to the next life. ok. going back to the 1950's, the eisenhower administration implemented a new look. the air force got a budget to build a be 57 b-52 bomber. the navy wanted to play in the strategic integrated operations as detailed in fisa admiral jerry miller's book. put nuclearwe weapons aboard ballistic submarines. the mission of defending the motherland from nuclear bombs. nuclear subs and combatants could go after our
[indiscernible] ganwhile, the best in stata -- strategy was implemented. a general war at sea with the soviet union could go nuclear fast. the navasota, i served on a ship that had the slogan [-- had a slogan "the next war is on us." one of the challenges operating with the capability of the western pacific was the sensitivity in japan. torch and only, i can neither was -- nor deny response
fortunately, the "i can neither confirm nor deny was ok with the japanese. regarding comparisons with the cold war today, many have noted commonalities between the former soviet union and china with respect to naval forces. both countries are continental and decisions of the soviets to put naval forces to the sea in the 1960's, they had , inexperiencedg officers to command. it followed the collision of a soviet destroyer with another ship in november, 1970. ussr approached the united states with soviet safeties seem measures. dangerous the type of
behaviors. low flight overpasses, bumping's, other harassments. thegnizing the emergence of 1990's of the chinese service force, there were calls for u.s.-china a in sea. it had negative connotations because it was signed by two superpowers as an effort to avoid world war iii. a major trade partner with newer social ties, indeed we had 300 thousand chinese students studying in the united states right now. you did not have that during the cold war with the soviet union. ofilitary consultant agreement was signed which facilitates the annual discussion of maritime issues. and initially lacked some of the issues. over time, the two nations adopted a code of unintended and
counters at sea that was created naval western pacific symposium. an annual gathering of navies that operate in the region. a friend of mine, captain smith, shared with me an encounter he had with a chinese forget in the eastern see a few years ago a end discussed the professionalism of his chinese counterpart. i am confident that even with the hc accord, one thing we can say for sure, with the hco court, there was a little bit of hanky-panky tween the u.s. and the ussr as i revealed in my dissertation. list of incidents we had post-1972 with the soviets. but the public never saw this because there was a classification called "for " and we. ri's only
would discuss this every year either in moscow or washington. concern today is social media. ok? in the 1980's i recall an incident and the soviet up alongside us and it had its forward gun out pointing at our bridge. a violation ofy the incidents at sea accord. i was thinking, is today the day world war iii is going to start? is there any reason for this? i was thinking, and no. this guy should be able to read "e" painted on the side of our ship, so any bomb he sends it to our ship is going to
take him out. if this was today, somebody on our single bridge would take a drive that, send it home to his father back, atlanta, and next thing you know it is on cnn, fox the for top this is before white house or kremlin would even have a with that this occurred. f that this had occurred and it would make the evening news cycle. that is a concern today. the other differences territorial seas. i am from new jersey. i used to go down to the seaside and sit on the beach and i could look out and see russian fishing boats there, because our at the time,eas the united states claimed three nautical miles. during a little bit of research, it was not until 1988 that we decided to go to 12.
is pretty recent history. one of the issues today, of course, with the creation of economic exclusion zones has been determined by some nations as an exclusion zone for non-economic activities. non-identification zones in the east china sea and south china sea. media andcial different views on territorial waters, i see the potential for artificial crises that could lead to some unfortunate crazies. i will leave it there and look forward to questions. ms. go to: there are some seats here. >> thank you very much. let me talk about topical things. cold war challenges. similarities and differences. then and now.
finally, japan's future defense role. ld war. that japaners argue was a free writer during the cold war. that is not true. theh japan was making biggest national security commitment in the 1980's in the history to-date. it played a critical role of helping the united states execute the maritime strategy. of thened in the center theater of confrontation in the u.s. and the soviet union in the to aic, japan undertook important missions. areas.cating one here, one here, and one
here. and, second, the defense of sea .ines of communication the objective of the trade blockade was to prevent soviet forces from advancing into the western pacific. the maritime self-defense force traumatically improved its anti-summary and wartime capabilities. c-130 as aed mine-laying platform. surface to ship missiles to attack soviet vessels sailing through the strait. of the defense was to make it possible for the u.s. aircraft carrier battle groups to stand safely to striking positions.
this is the northernmost island here. the maritime self-defense force was tasked with the anti-submarine operation and passages inng safe the western pacific for the u.s. carrier battle groups. while taking up these new missions, the self-defense forces continue to provide protection over the united states bases in japan, such as severalforce base in areas and never he bases in -- and navy bases. defense provided by the self-defense forces, the u.s. forces could focus on offensive strike operations
against the soviet far east. japan's commitment to the united resultstrategy did not from political mischief. it was a result of the concerted efforts made by the officials and officers of the japan defense agency, the self-defense forces, the minister for the fears -- the minister of foreign minister of the finance. when another came into office in 1982 that the japanese prime minister consciously and doors to his country's commitment to the global security strategy. close defense u.s. strategy produced good results. acording to a require -- retired u.s. navy officer in a
day japan specialist, no u.s. navy operator would doubt the executing the strategy, he said it was unbelievable that we tracked every soviet submarine by the end of the cold war. former soviet leaders say one of the retired soviet officers has acknowledged the soviets took the presence of allied navies such as japanese, in exercises, very seriously. he even mentioned his respect for the japanese maritime defense force. there are successes, there are challenges. during the cold war, u.s. planners were concerned that japan might become neutralized in case of war. the u.s. government clearly
indicated this concern. example, the for soviet military power from 1989, published by the u.s. department of state of defense, stated, the soviet merger objectives in the past included, into a quote, neutralizing japan and south korea by military or political means to prevent them from supporting the united states. ". several scenarios were looked into as the global war games were conducted at the u.s. naval war college in the 1970's and 1980's. in the 1979 games, the social -- the soviet union offered incentives to france, israel, pakistan, and algeria to remain neutral. in the 19 80 game, the soviet
union detonated three nuclear weapons east of japan to intimidate the japanese government into neutrality. in the 1984 game, the soviet union perceived that it would be impossible to keep japan that diplomatic and political pressure into a threat. so they launched a large-scale air attack on japan. in the three-year games in 1985 in 1980 seven was more interesting. in these games, japan went back-and-forth between the united states and soviet union. during the first week of hostilities, the united states air operations in japan using u.s. and japanese bases against the soviet union. thatthere was a protest this was not in keeping with japan's professed neutrality,
the japanese condemned the united states actions and band the future use of japanese soil as a base for u.s. attacks on soviet courses. but then, japan decided to take two aircraft carriers into the o socko not a it wasve action, but regarded as a serious violation of neutrality and they attack japan. governmentpanese made a decision to fully take obligations and pledged to use it self-defense force to protect united states forces in japan. hypothetical scenarios used for wargames. nevertheless, a repeated appearance of this name clearly the united states planners took this seriously and examined how best to prevent japan from getting neutralized
and, if it did, how to fight a global war without participation. it is hardly surprising that the u.s. planners were concerned about the neutralization of japan. first, despite japan's acquisition of modern equipment such as f-15 fighters that and other aircraft, it was doubtful the self-defense force had the real war fighting capabilities. shortage of ammunition supplies seriously limited the execution of realistic live fire exercises. many of the japanese self-defense forces did not have aircraft shelters. planswere no emergency defining the rights and citizens of japanese citizens and major by theons conducted
self-defense forces and wartime. in 2003 and 2004, more than 10 years after the cold war, the japanese parliament announced registration necessary for wartime operations. but a few differences between , there is both good news and bad news when the current strategic environment in the pacific as compared with that of the cold war era. war, some of the offered the soviet union a natural barrier .eparating them from the sea today, japan controls these island, the southwestern and can use it as a natural defense of barrier.
however, the only exit the soviet fleet had for advising the western pacific was has atght, today, china least nine or 10 locations that could be used because it is a long island chain with a lot of gaps between them. is superior to soviet [ion, which collapsed because -- scernible] according to the stockholm institute,al peace chinese expense expenditure grew by a remarkable 167% in the last decade while the u.s.-japanese
expenditure decreased by 0.4 and 3.7% respectively. finally, japan's future roles. defense roles in the future conflict will look very much ones during the cold war. the air force defense force will focus on defense with a new emphasis on crude missiles for defense. japan are becoming more vulnerable by the day with air forceued korean buildup. planned introduction of s-30 five fighters will help ease the mounting pressure. s-two fighter-bombers can help against southeast vessels. the maritime self-defense force safe seainue to divide
lines of communication to u.s. carrier battle groups operating in the western pacific and with his anti-submarine warfare capabilities which are one of the best in the world. moreover, it will now protect u.s. carrier battle groups from not only submarines that also from anti-ship missiles that china is developing. be ballistic missile will upgraded to more advanced systems in the years to come. the ground self-defense force stop hostileto vessels at the straight along the south western island chain. new targets or ship missile on the island chain like this, with a range of over
150 kilometers taking cover all over the straits in the island chain. the self-defense force will execute similar defense missions, japan will face similar challenges. as the soviet union seeks to japan and case of conflict, north korea and china will do the same. why now, north korea has deployed more than 200 missiles capable of reaching japan. with possible miniaturized and usable nuclear devices. north korea can explode a nuclear bomb in japan's vicinity do as the soviet union did in 1980. they may seek to neutralize japan's population.
according to the public opinion the 32% of the japanese responding felt the new .egislation would strengthen 64% of them answered it would make it more likely that japan might get and trapped in foreign wars. entrapped in foreign wars. 74% agreed that japan would not get drawn into wars by the united states even if the situation was and acted. japang the isolation of -- the isolationists in japan committed to security will
remain a challenge. thank you very much. [applause] goto: we have a full house. we are excited to have c-span with his. there is a microphone if you have questions. please raise your hand and introduce yourself. would interest of time, i like to take two or three questions together. let's initially go with this gentleman, and then with the gentleman who is up high. >> thank you. i am henry, a researcher and retired federal government. few years, we have seen japan fortified as an artificial island in the sol cg. many years ago, all chinese
serious military strategy indicated in a war they must be clever. there is a limit to how much clever and can be tolerated by the united nations. in regards to this, i wonder what the current strategy should be in regard to such an island built. prior to world war ii, japan fortified all of these islands that were mandated by the league of nations. was supposed to guarantee their independence at the time. strategies also did not work out. as such, it was a powerful region they had but secretive sort of, no other naval ships entered the area. situationve a similar we will face in the south china sea. what can in should be done to develop a strategy to face this? >> hello. steve's wendler, officer of
senator dan coats. the first part of my question is, how is the situation both similar and different with the cold war with americans and japanese versus the soviets. now, the situation with china. terroroday, would using groups defensively and forwardly deployed like what was supposed to be done in the cold war, is that still viable world might we have to move to something else or do you have any thoughts on that topic? thank you. >> i guess regarding the question of what can we do about the artificial islands that are being created in the south china navythe one thing that the and government has made a commitment to his freedom of navigation operations. freedom of navigation operations it has been argued, that it would be beneficial to join me since 1979 but in
reality to go back to naval history, all the way back to the -- iny wars against tripoli, establishing our right to freedom of the seas, freedom of navigation operations, we conducted them in the -- against the, you know, soviet union. they claim some survey waters that we did not agree on -- some soviet waters that we did not agree in. the bumping incident was the karen and yorktown being bumped by a soviet forget in 1988 in sea.lack we were demonstrating freedom of navigation. there is a role in international law that the insula juts out, you do not have to go around 12 miles around that. you cannot just cut through. we were demonstrating that international right and to the
soviets disagreed. subsequently, there was a meeting at jackson hole and the soviets came in line with the correct interpretation. innocentyou know, passages in that case. our understanding is the united states navy and other navies of the world, will continue to transit these waters close to these little island outposts that the chinese are creating in the south china sea. that will continue on for, you know, the near and distant future. >> a couple points are important. in the time before world war ii, given the nature of the world situation, technology, and the messick policy, navies did not normally coast of their
designated enemies. during the time that edmund mill was writing about, the fleet practice near hawaii, near panama. other not practice off islands. that'll changed after world war ii. not immediately after world war ii. 1940 nine,, 1940 8, it became pretty clear that based on the expanse of world war ii, based on new technology, and based on the unfolding world situation, the thing to do with the fleet was to stick it in the face of the enemy and the time of peace to keep it from doing anything at time of war. so they set up the six fleet in and turned itean around with the seventh fleet in the western pacific, extremely fortuitously, because the carrier was in the pacific one koreakarina -- one north
came south and it showed the futility of having this but it did help stop them. but ever since then, the convention has been to the u.s. forward battle fleets, sometimes three, pretty stretched, things dave talked about, you need a lot to be able to do this, off the coast of wherever you are operating. why is this important? because in the south china sea, we have been operating in the south china sea since world war ii. forward. always. trudging back-and-forth, and also being that. and we have a strategic ally in the ec. it is a direct line to another treaty ally, depending upon where you are going, japan, south korea, austria. it is also a line of communication to emerging friends india and vietnam.
the presence of the fleet, the seventh fleet, in the china sea, which has been continuous difference in a the kind of things you are talking about when japan was fortifying islands out in the pacific and no one went near them. we have made a practice is world war ii of going near those places that are of interest to us, even if they are 10,000 miles away. parenthetically that is one of the things that drives the large, robust, fully-capable ships we build because they have to be able to go out and stay out there for 6, 7, 8, nine months to do their jobs. that is different from operations in international waters, different from the insertions of freedom -- the assertions of freedom of navigation in which we assert things are a national waters that the local things are not.
in waters that are incontestably international, we operate. we operate forward and we have since then and that seems to do the job for presence, crises, and war fighting. having -- thet it point about of having such a strategy is viable given the airats of an creasing like carriers, and article came out recently by a guy named michael hass. it is on a blog that just came out in the last week. he makes a point that carriers have always been vulnerable. they are of fighting ships. that is what they're for. when the japanese carriers met american carriers off midway, the assumption was not that the japanese might lose a carrier,
the americans might lose a carrier. we better back off. all during world war ii, carrier ships iniers and other the western pacific because that is what warships are for. it is not pleasant. it is not nice to think about. but this is what fighting ships do. soviets, thef the time i discussed, they had, still have, backfire bombers. bomber overflyre you caring these humongous missiles under them really sober she. as dave said, is world war iii going to start? look at the size of that. but we have countermeasures. we develop in equipment, we develop tactics. an amazing ballet of 14 fighters.
, the kinds of radar-caring planes. b-twos that can see out for thousands of miles and tell where everybody is an vector in the scenes. where tankers have to be to resupply at-14's. where the electronic warfare planes have to be in order to jam the radars. all of those were worked out during the cold war. the same was submarine tactics. the same of surface tack ask. we're doing that. well, i am not doing that i have not been in the navy for 20 years. but the naval forces are doing it today. they are not going to touch us. the answer for 40 years, i don't know. between now and then, many things can happen but what the
that's whathanks you pay for. figure out ways to make sure those carriers can stay forward, the cruisers can state or word, the submarines can stay forward job. their whether or not it is going to work as wonderfully as i just laid out as a maritime strategy we do not know, but the navy is certainly trying and you just saw a recently, for example, secretary of defense carter mentioned off hand in a speech, a mission we had never publicly disclosed. in our there are other systems we have that we never publicly disclosed we are working on, just as, i am sure he must suspect, the russians and the chinese and others are also own systems.eir somehow the carrier, well, they might hit it. we better back off. that is not why you have a carrier. are built to stand
and fight to and hopefully win if we develop the right kind of systems. and we are working away at bad as we speak. >> let me take the u.s. defense question. i think the most important similarity is how we divide our roles. to, the u.s. continues to, provide strike offensive capabilities were as we kind of take care of our defense. we do so partly because, i mean, that is what -- partly because of the japanese defense policy which basically is not -- we are not willing to possess defensive capabilities because it can be destabilizing in because the ban was aggressive in the passive war. at least, in the beginning just after the end of the war, it was possess offensive
capabilities and this has continued. air defense, submarine warfare, you know, in case of mine warfare, we undertake both offensive and defensive mine warfare of those things. what is new after the end of the cold war is the introduction of missile defense. not, even that is we invest a lot of resources and defense which is basically defense-oriented capabilities. and also, another reason why we focus on defense is that we are close to the source of threat. you know, we are close to the soviet union, north korea, china. we have to defend across the board before we start thinking of strike capabilities. i think the two forces, u.s. and japan, are now
much more closely integrated. so that, i think, is one of the most important differences. for example, in case of defense, wessile have a ground defense and environment which is integrated with the u.s. and japan intervention gary target information-sharing system acquisition. second, in terms of alliance management, the relationship has become a little bit more complicated because of the --.gence of japan was worried about, you know, in the 1980's, getting entrapped by the wars that the united states might fight with the soviet union on a global level.
but we don't have to worry about abandonment because the united states needed us. but now, we certainly sometimes, when the u.s. relationship improves, we kind of start worrying about abandonment and the u.s. and china are not in a cold war. right? as it in the soviet case. a smalle island is island into important for us but not really, doesn't, don't have critical strategic importance, so it is more like a symbolic importance that they have. now we are much more comfortable after president obama said, you know, the united states would be willing to defend as part of a treaty of litigation between the countries two years ago. but you know, japanese planners are a little can -- concerned
about that. the u.s. does not have to worry about entrapped and by japan in the war. so you know, we have both we have to worry about defending. and, thirdly, and maybe finally, now japan has a much stronger interested and willing to undertake in a serious manner and think about and implement policies leading this process of japanese defense is, yound i think this know, a good thing for japan because it has accountability and democracy in my country. goto: we have time for two
more quick questions if we can get the gentleman here and tom. >> [indiscernible] -- a problem we did not see during the cold war between the united states and the soviet union. whether thereg were any lessons you could learn from japan so we can adjust our thinking in order to target [indiscernible]. michishita: thank you for coming.
apan native, he u.s. -- >> i have two questions. regarding northern territory. that.u comment on because i understand that japan and russia are meeting in may. that is what i heard last week. so, what is the possibility of talking about territory? and, the marine base in open outlook, i heard they may be moving to -- the marine base in awa, i heard they may be moving to guam. going to stay? are we moving? >> you know, you might think
coal location in the vicinity is more serious was what the soviet union doing. i do not think so. what the soviet union was doing was much more provocative in times of the capabilities that they had a and the aggressive maneuvers they work conducting in the vicinity in the face of our self-defense assets in the sea and in the air. know, --uite, you vessels frequently pointed guns at us. partially the navy suggested now this is the information age. we get information very quickly and easily. , at least thew
japanese citizen, know that the soviet destroyer was pointing its gun at us. we did not know. all of these things, difficulties and provocative action going on, we just had blind eyes. good news, bad news. we are not informed by the united states. we kind of feel at peace, that is the good news. 0 --but it am not to is certainly in a way more difficult because we have to defend. northern territory's. because the russians occupied them. we did not have to defend them. news,at i think is good bad news. maintaining administrative control. sovereignty over the islands. bad news, we have to defend
islands. i would like to make a comment. i attended a conference in shanghai about five years ago on united states, japanese, chinese, trilateral maritime relations. reality, that- in trilateral relationship was more like two bilateral relationships. this was after the instance of the bumping into the ships. shouting at each other. have is kind of like during world war ii, china and the united states had a very vis-a-vis japan and during the cold war, japan and the united states had a very tight relationship vis-a-vis the soviet union and in part towards thea, especially during
1950's and 1960's and early 1970's. i do not recall any situation where china and japan worry aligned against the unit -- were aligned against the united states. so we had this interesting dynamic. as far as dealing with china, we must continue to engage. we need to work with china as far as -- [laughter] them on theith anti-piracy controls offer somalia. we were with him on humanitarian assistant operations, they have a fabulous hospital ship. they have been a participant in exercises.rim pack that is one way to kind of counter this concerned that we are trying to do another know, with --ou
know,bring them into, you the international community as a full partner. that is something we have to work hard at. isi think in the sense it similar to the response about the aircraft carrier. we have had 25 years of non-cold war. hot wars against competitors. we have slashed our defense structure, at least the united states has, japan somewhat, the europeans enormously. we have gotten used to the fact that we can send naval forces around the world anywhere to do anything and if you decide you want to go obama libyans you do not like or iraqis you do not like or somebody else you do not like, you go ahead and do it. it look easy. we are forgetting what the cold war was like. i want to reiterate what others
said. there were complications every day at sea and some were enormously dangerous and that is one of the reasons for the sea agreement that dave so brilliantly chronicled and reminds us of all the time. every year the japanese navy does an exercise. expect, if you're japanese, the navy is keeping itself current and does an exercise. you would expect of it has an ally at would invite the ally to join and that happened increasingly during the 80's. 40, 50 soviet bombers flying over the exercise whenever the exercise occurred. that were not really fishing boats and agi's following around each ship and each unit. that was routine. that was not some exciting thing that just happen that would make the newspapers because that is how we operate it. all of the exercises were
conducted under the umbrella of soviet anti-ship bombers and followed around by ships on the surface. does not even count on what ships underh the the surface. the famous incident in which one of the soviet ships is following to close and rose up under one of the american ships and sliced and and the crew was all excited, submarine on its island, and said, we are a sub-getting aircraft carrier. that could have resulted in serious loss of life. took kinds of incidents place, unfortunately, routinely. ist is happening now worrisome, most certainly but it does not really even compared to the things that happened every day that caused people to sit around and hammer out the hasement that dave
discussed. i want to answer the questions about the marines, i am not an expert so i am not trying to be quite. i simply do not know but i will type what i do know which is vague. there are three divisions of marines and three air wings of marines. the smallest of the three divisions and air wings is located on oaken a la and has nawa and has been since the 1950's. the marine corps likes it there, the air force likes it there. okinawa has changed. it is a big plays with big cities and the cities have grown up around the bases. that has happened on mainland japan, in the united states, where a naval base or near four is put out in the woods in the 1920's and now it is surrounded by a giant city.
at oceana in norfolk and we have this near san diego. oaken allen's do not like having this. these 19-year-old's marines running around with testosterone, bumping into each other. they want the marines out. ok, so marines out. what, wonderful place. a compromise got hammered out several years ago and which, i will not be clear on this, but i think it is about half of the marines that were currently in open now at that time were going to leave and go to places like in and out ofe australia. there were a number of options explored. other marines were going to awa and there were going to be some buying of land, exchanges of land, operations plan a more remote part of the island and so far. that the open allen's -- the
okinawans and marines have never been happy about that. congress says, you are going to build facilities? i think that is great. i think if you are going to build them in the sovereign state of indiana, that would be super. at your not. [laughter] in otherbuilding them places. we not going to give you a dime to build them in guam. is a complex issue and it is still in play. recently, there have been changes. not want to paraphrase because i will get it wrong, but this continues to cook. centralnese government, government, traditionally kinawas the marines in o
as important and they get it. they have a whole bunch of marines living in an area they would rather they did not live. this continues. this remains a discussion. nobody is shooting at each other and hopefully something will work out that will be satisfactory at least were a few years before they renegotiate something else. i am not eating cory. that is about what i know about it. coy about it.ing that is what i know about it. way, -- [ indiscernible] goto: it is time for us to
go our separate ways. you may be wondering why are speakers did -- why our speakers did not question each other. last week, they spent a few hours together hashing this out. peaceful reached a conclusion to their talks. we will be summarizing their findings from that conversation. we hope to have that available online and in print within the next few weeks. those of you who are registered he automatically getting an electronic version and i hope you will be able to read that and continued the conversation. i want to thank our three speakers for joining us and i want to thank you all. thank you for coming. [applause]